The following is an extract from two research papers written by the House of Commons Research Department

The full texts can be found at

http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-057.pdf
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-058.pdf

Conflicts in the early 1990s, in particular in the Balkans, had suggested that there might
be a greater need for a European capability in defence, particularly when US and
European interests did not clearly coincide, and that this might actually serve to bolster
the transatlantic relationship. In material terms, however, there were many practical
impediments to its development. Europe’s forces were unable to respond rapidly to
modern contingencies and were primarily organised around plans for fighting Soviet
armies and territorial defence. As the Kosovo conflict highlighted, they lacked
deployability and flexibility, modern command and communications equipment, precision
munitions, strategic lift capability, and expeditionary logistics capability. Europeans had
some two million men and women in uniform but had very limited ability to actually field
them.

However, the development of a European defence capability became one of the themes
at the NATO Berlin summit in 1996, when the concept of a European Security and
Defence Identity (ESDI) was launched. The idea of ESDI was to encourage European
nations to make a more effective contribution to NATO through ‘separable but not
separate’ European forces.

This idea of improving European military capabilities within the context of the NATO
framework defined the UK’s general approach towards European defence over the Blair
period. As Wyn Rees explains, moving away from Labour’s traditional scepticism
towards European defence prior to taking power, the Blair government came “to
envisage a more equitably balanced defence arrangement in which transatlantic
structures are matched by more capable European ones”. Blair thus sought to
reconcile the strategic imperative of preserving the transatlantic relationship whilst
simultaneously encouraging the development of a European military capability.

Although Labour displayed considerable activism on the issue of defence and in pushing
forward CFSP whilst holding the EU presidency between January and June 1998, the
first real signs of Blair’s policy line emerged during the Franco-British summit at St Malo
in December 1998. What has come to be considered the turning point for European
defence, the summit sought to develop practical improvements in Europe’s capacity to
independently deploy forces as well as consider institutional arrangements. It identified
the need for the EU to have credible military capability, the means to use it, and the
readiness to do so. This presaged an active role on the part of the UK in encouraging
progress in the EU’s strategy, capability and operations. Indeed, St Malo was seen as
something of a U-turn by Blair despite his insistence that the ESDP was not an
alternative to NATO.
Further progress on developing ESDP was achieved at the EU Summits in Cologne
and Helsinki in 1999, when it was decided that the EU would be endowed with the
capacity for autonomous military action. At Helsinki the ‘Headline Goal’ was agreed
whereby the EU would take on the Petersberg tasks and commit to developing readily
deployable military capability through voluntary, but co-ordinated, national and
multinational efforts. EU leaders planned for a Rapid Reaction Corps to be able to deploy within 60 days, sustain up to 60,000 personnel for one year, and have the capability to undertake the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks.

Over the next few years a series of conferences were held which discussed the issue of the development of European military capabilities in greater detail. As a result a new Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue was approved in November 2002. A major development also came with the agreement of the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements in December 2002. Under this arrangement the EU would be granted access to NATO assets and operational planning capabilities in order to mount ESDP operations.

As Wyn Rees noted “This initiative was of considerable significance for British attitudes
towards Europe. It…demonstrated a willingness to begin to build a meaningful military
capability within the framework of European integration”. However, as he also pointed
out, “allowing the EU to develop a defence competence has unleashed a powerful new
dynamic in the European security debate”. In political terms, the battle-lines over
European defence have been broadly drawn between pro-Atlanticist and pro-European
nations. This has essentially been a political tussle between those who have wanted to
ensure American engagement in Europe and ensure the primacy of NATO and those
who want to give Europe a more independent military identity.

The challenge for the Blair Government was thus to attempt to steer the process within acceptable boundaries, keeping the US content, whilst giving concrete support to the development of ESDP. The UK with its strong bilateral relationship with the US thus positioned itself as key mediator or, in Blair’s terminology, a bridge, between America and Europe and at once sought to strengthen Europe’s military capabilities whilst restraining its strategic ambitions.

Events in 2003 summed up the difficulty of maintaining this policy position given the
independent momentum that the ESDP gathered, partly due to British encouragement.
At a time when European tensions over the conflict in Iraq remained high, France,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany came together in a “mini summit” – derisively
termed the ‘chocolate summit’ by some observers – to discuss enhancing Europe’s
defence potential, primarily through the creation of an independent EU military planning
cell based at Teuveren and outside the NATO framework.

Such moves were deemed to be contrary to the fundamental principle of complementarity between Europe and NATO and were thus strongly opposed by the UK. In August 2003 the British Government subsequently circulated a paper entitled Food for Thought to all EU Member and Acceding States.

Along with proposals on structured co-operation and mutual defence,
the paper presented an alternative to the “Teuveren proposal” and one that would place
any EU planning capability firmly within the NATO framework. The paper’s support for
EU planning within NATO was interpreted by many as a firm indication of UK opposition
to the Teuveren plans, a position also supported by several EU Member States including
Spain, Italy and Poland. However, it was regarded by others as an acceptance by the UK of its need to remain involved in the ESDP debate in order to shape any potential
outcome. The Food for Thought paper was considered as the first step towards a
compromise.

After considerable negotiation, an agreement was reached at Naples in November 2003
whereby a small operational planning cell of 30-40 personnel would be established within the existing EU Military Staff in Brussels, rather than as an independent entity. Under this ‘structured cooperation’ agreement an independent EU operation run from its own headquarters would be a last resort when the US or NATO chose not to be engaged. As Anand Menon concluded in 2004:

Given that the persistent theme of UK pronouncements on ESDP has been the
need to ensure a policy which is consistent, and not competing, with NATO, it
would appear that the outcome of recent discussions within the Union represents
something of a triumph for London. On the other hand, it is important that the UK
does not allow what may well have been sensible pragmatism to be perceived as
thinly disguised obstructionism…[which] runs the risk of seeing its
partners…attempting to resurrect the more ambitious schemes that the Iraq
crisis, for the moment, has consigned to the dustbin.

A number of commentators expressed concern at the time, however, “that a large oak
[would] grow from the acorn being planted in Brussels”.

In order to demonstrate the UK’s continued commitment to the ESDP agenda and
smooth over tensions that had arisen over the Teuveren proposals, measures to
advance ESDP were put forward at the Franco-British summit in November 2003. As
part of the longstanding aim to develop European military capabilities, the summit
proposed the establishment of EU ‘battlegroups’ as part of the Helsinki Headline Goal
which would be capable of rapid deployment in support of UN or other crisis
management operations. These plans were based on the need for effective, credible and
coherent high-readiness forces and were not intended to replace the European Rapid
Reaction Force or the NATO Response Force. At a meeting of the EU Council of
Ministers in November 2003 the British government also agreed to the establishment of
the European Defence Agency in an effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities.

Many observers, however, expressed strong doubts as to the actual European military
capability that materialised despite all the declarations associated with ESDP. An article
in the International Herald Tribune in January 2004 commented that the EU:
Does not have the capacity or the will to deploy and sustain troops outside
Europe for prolonged periods of time. At the same time, its political leverage – for
all its worth – is a poor substitute for hard power.

Bernard Jenkin noted that “European defence policy is more about EU vanity than real
defence capability: almost entirely fantasy”. Jenkin went on to claim that, “what Mr Blair
has bequeathed at the end of his ten years in office is an EU political defence apparatus
duplicating and competing with NATO, but which is unable to carry out anything but the
most minor of humanitarian operations”.

Nevertheless, by mid-2007 and Blair’s departure from office the EU had conducted a
significant number of ESDP operations, albeit mostly small-scale crisis management,
police and rule-of-law missions. The EU has since 2004 also undertaken some high-level peacekeeping operations such as Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Operation Althea in Bosnia. The EU also established a civil-military operation in Darfur.

Thus, the last decade has seen ESDP gain significant momentum. While many commentators continued to bemoan the military credibility and effectiveness of European capabilities, there is no doubt that Blair’s activism with regard to ESDP was an important factor in the gradual strengthening and consolidation of European defence.