Summary

Since 1990 China has embarked upon an ambitious and expensive project to upgrade her armed forces with modern weapons. The Chinese leadership relies upon the military for prestige, therefore the acquisition and development of new weapons has political as well as military motivations.

Russia has supplied the bulk of China's new weapons. Russia has exported to China technologies that have not left her shores before. China has also acquired the rights to manufacture fighter planes on her soil. However there are still a number of deficiencies in the equipment and the PLA's ability to use it.

The new capability has been bought with Taiwan uppermost in the minds of Chinese leaders. It

The role of the military in China

Since the end of the Cold War there is no credible military threat to China. The greatest threat to the Chinese regime comes from domestic dissatisfaction with the government of the Cinese Communist Party (CCP). Domestic crises rather than invasion by imperialists exercise the minds of decision-makers in Beijing.

Dissatisfaction with the leadership stems from the rampant corruption found in all levels of the government and bureaucracy, and the lack human rights and democratic accountability within the state. The regime maintains the acquiescence of its people through providing economic development, political order, and a revival of China's international prestige.

Economic development is the most important. For as long as the leadership can supply rising living standards the populous are likely to accept the regime. China's stated policy is to keep military modernisation in second place to promoting development - this principle has, and will, restricted the amount leaders are willing to spend on arms procurement.

This awkward social contract has provided a semblance of political order within China and is essential if the CCP elite wish to maintain their hold upon power. The military role in this political bargain is complicated. Their traditional role has been to act as the vanguard of the CCP and defend it from enemies within and outwith the state.

Coinciding with Deng's embrace of capitalism, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), China's unified armed forces, have built another role: to enhance and maintain China's prestige abroad. Prestige, a need to be seen to be in the first division of states, was the main reason for the Chinese nuclear programme, and it lies at the heart of her current conventional modernisation.

During the 19th century China was colonised in all but name by Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the USA (she escaped being formally annexed by the powers because they couldn't agree how to divide the country). The over-riding goal of Chinese foreign policy since the removal of the last foreign forces in 1949 has been to recapture 'stolen' territories and gain the respect it is felt she deserves. The handing back of Hong Kong and Macao marks the end of foreign occupation of China proper. Now all that is left are the offshore territories of Taiwan and the South China Sea islands.

Merely by existing, a Chinese military armed with modern weapons will show the Chinese people that their leaders can make their country feared and respected. A second, and much more destabilising, factor is the ability of the military to deal with any future loss of face - such as a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan or further encroachments upon her possessions in the South China Sea.

The need to modernise

Since 1949, China has fought in three major wars - in Korea against the US lead forces in the early 1950s, against India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. In Korea and Vietnam she received a bloody nose. While military objectives were met she endured much greater casualties than her opponents. The PLA had been designed, as Mao put it, 'to drown an invader in an ocean of peoples war '. It possessed millions of poorly armed recruits that could bog down any invader but were ineffective on the offensive.

Since the revolution, the PLA has always been hampered by its lack of sophisticated weaponry. During the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, technicians and other professionals were 'purged' from the armed forces and defence industries. In the era when the West was developing digital technology, China ditched its own technical class.

Though China has sought to catch up during the 1980s, Chinese designed and produced weapons are vastly inferior to their western counterparts.

Only the Chinese nuclear programme shows a great deal of indigenous development. Many conventional weapons are straight copies of equipment that has been bought and then reverse engineered. The KS-1 and LY-60 missiles are copies of the French Crotale and Italian Aspide missiles which were sold to China in small numbers.

As well as her lack of design expertise, Chinese defence exports have shown an inability to produce precision engineering. Vessels delivered to Egypt and Thailand have shown design and building defects that needed considerable effort to rectify after the ship had been delivered. Bulkheads were too weak to act as a platform for weapons systems, and in some ships whole compartments were sealed without an entrance.

China's defence industry has failed to realise the potential of the country's industrial modernisation. The new hi-tech industries are found in the south – near Shanghai and Hong Kong - while the Chinese defence establishment is located in the old heavy industries of the north. The highly bureaucratised one party state inhibits the movement of people, techniques, and ideas between the different industry sectors.

Thus far China has shown an inability to design or produce weapon systems using digital technology. Old mechanical systems, that China acquired from Russia in the 1950s, were very easy to copy. However digital systems have a microscopic complexity, and the all important software may be irretrievable or incomprehensible to Chinese programmers.

The most important aspects of digital technology are flexibility and command and control - aspects that Chinese forces lack. For instance, China has fighters and bombers rather than the West's multi-role fighter-bombers because the fire control systems in the planes are dedicated to one or the other and can't be modified.

Jianghu Class frigates exported to Thailand in 1990 lacked a computerised combat direction system and it didn’t even have a western style Combat Information Centre. Computer consoles supplied contained western chips and no attempt had been made to integrate the computers. Without a computer driven combat direction system a ship can not deal with air attacks as its defensive systems saturate too easily.

There is little evidence that China has developed command and control capability comparable to western standards. Chinese forces have not fought for 20 years, it is likely that her decision-makers will have little idea of the importance of modern command and control, and generals may be complacent or be unwilling to tell their political leaders about the deficiencies of her forces.

Further command and control problems arise from the integrated nature of the PLA. High ranking sea commanders may be transferred to equivalent air force positions without experience or training of air operations.

The Chinese armed forces comprise: 3 million people; 7000-8000 tanks; 14 500 towed; artillery; 5000 fixed wing aircraft; 50 major surface combatants; and52 submarines. It would be an impossible task to modernise this force and bring it up to western standards. Instead the CCP leadership has embarked upon a policy of buying, or developing, modern weapon systems that will be added to the inventory in small numbers.

Acquiring modern weapons

During the late 1980s, three principles were articulated to guide China's quest for 'secret and superb' weapons:

The early 1990s brought a happy coincidence for China - her own economic boom occurred concurrently with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Russia's subsequent impoverishment.

China identified three types of technology that she needed from Russia - guidance for cruise missiles, defence from air attack, and the means to co-ordinate a naval blockade (see the appendix for the full shopping list).

1990 brought the first Sino-Soviet arms deal for some 30 years. November 1992 brought an intergovernmental commission to formalise the relationship wwhich meets annually and has a number of permanent working parties. In mid 1993 another deal was concluded for the S-300-PMU air defence system and Su-27 aircraft.

In 1992 an 'arms for corn' barter system was developed. Chinese payment has been made in 3 ways:

In June 1993 the Chinese government allocated $2.3 – 2.6 billion solely to purchase foreign arms within the next two years, almost all went to Russia. As only 50% of the goods were to be paid in cash the real equipment spend was likely to be $4-5 billion.

Significant developments

Aircraft

China has bought 72 SU-27 fighter-bombers, Il-76 transports, 4 TU-26 long-range bombers is training its pilots on them. She has set up a licensed production line to produce another 150 SU-27, and is negotiating a MiG-31 fighter-interceptor production line.

Aviation experts describe the Su-27 as among the most modern, capable fighter planes in the world. It has a state-of-the-art weapon system and can utilise a wide variety of air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance. China is also developing the FC- 1 lightweight fighter which is based on the design for the MiG-33 which was rejected by the Soviet Air Force. Israel and several European countries are being considered as suppliers for the plane's avionics.

A third fighter plane, the J-10 (F-10), multi-role fighter is based on technology developed in Israel for the U.S.-financed Lavi fighter program, which was cancelled in 1987. It is unclear what specific technologies and systems Israel has provided. There are unconfirmed reports that the Israeli contribution will focus on avionics and radar, with Russia supplying the engines

As yet China has been unsuccessful in her efforts to acquire the long-range TU-22M Backfire bomber (which has a 4000km un-refueled range) and is far more advanced than China's principal bomber, the H-6. Possession of the backfire, let alone a production facility, would severely intimidate China's neighbours.

There is a tendency to overstate what the development and procurement of aircraft means for combat capability. While a reporter for Jane's Defence Weekly trumpeted that "China's double-digit economic growth is funding three major combat aircraft development programmes at a time when the whole of Europe can barely afford two," it is wrong simply to count planes and compare them with aircraft in the west.

Production of one of the three planes, the FC-1, is a joint project with Pakistan with the plane designed for export. It is very doubtful that China will actually procure the FC-1 as well as the J-10 and Soviet Planes.

It may be a long time before the J-10 is operational. China's A-2 attack plane was not deployed until 8 years after its initial test flight, and there is no reason to think that the J-10 will enter service any faster, it is very unlikley to be deployed before 2004.

The sales of Soviet weapons to China have been described as a "fire sale." However, the Su-27 purchase was no bargain: at a cost of $1 billion for 26 planes, this works out to nearly $40 million per plane (the fact that 35 percent of the cost was in barter notwithstanding). Disagreements over price meant that the second batch of planes was sitting out in harsh Russian weather for more than 2 years, suffering significant deterioration. Metal fatigue has been a problem. The final batch will have suffered even more.

Chinese maintenance procedures are poor: of 24 Sikorsky helicopters purchased from the United States 12 years ago, only 3 or 4 are still in service. PLA air force pilots train only about 80 hours a year on the average, rarely practice over water, and are reluctant to push an aircraft to the edge of its capabilities for fear of loosing the aircraft. When the first Su-27 crashes, pilots will be more reluctant to practice the extreme for which it has been designed. The Russian complaints about Chinese pilots are perhaps mitigated by the fact that the planes came without training manuals.

Despite the SU-27s world beating potential, the planes are likely to have very low operational readiness due to poor maintenance, insufficient training and poor logistics. It has even been reported that after lengthy training in Russia, the Chinese pilots designated to take over the Su-27s were so unskilled that Russian pilots had to deliver the planes to Chinese bases.

Naval vessels

China has also bought 4 Kilo-class submarines from Russia, is expected to take possession of six other Kilo-class "Varshavianka" submarines in the near future, and is building its own follow-on known as the Song class (originally Wuhan-C). At least some of the Russian submarines are the improved Kilo Class that uses advanced quieting technology. There are reports that China is expected to buy a further 12 Kilos.

In addition to the Kilos, she has procured two Sovremny Class destroyers that are armed with the Mach-2 Sunburn anti-ship missile.

There are numerous, and unconfirmed, reports that Russia has helped China to produce, or procure, an aircraft carrier. Jane's Fighting Ships 1997-8 stated that the Russian Nevskoye Design Bureau was given a contract in 1994 to design an aircraft carrier based upon Chinese specifications. There are also reports that she has received aid from France.

There is a long running story that the half completed Ukrainian carrier Varyag will be used at the basis for China's first carrier. These were revived at the end of March by reports in the Japanese press that the Varyag had been bought by a Chinese firm, ostensibly for scrap or to be used a floating casino. The suspicion was that the ultimate destination for the ship would be the PLA.

However, the Varyag would take a long time to get into active service. She is not complete and has been lying half-completed for over six years. By now she will be in a very bad condition and require extensive work to get her seaworthy. Carriers need a number of support ships to provide air and submarine defence as well as logistic support. China does not have those escort ships.

Given the work required and the lack of support ships, it is very unlikely that the Varyag could be used as an operational carrier, if ever, before 2010. A hull built in China to a Russian design incorporating Russian and Western technology would be a much more likely method of acquiring an aircraft carrier.

Until about 15 years ago, PLA-Navy (PLA-N) lacked SAM protection for its ships, which were equipped solely with anti-aircraft guns. It had very little ASW capability. Western analysts doubted that the Chinese navy would be effective, even against smaller navies, once its ships left the mainland's coast.

The modernisation programme has rectified this situation - the PLA-N is now better able to defend itself, even in the absence of air cover, in contested waters such as the South China Sea. By the early 1990s, PLAN had a line-of-sight air defence capability out to 13 kilometres and up to 8,000 meters. Its missiles are judged effective against aircraft as well as sea skimming surface-to-surface or air-to-surface anti-ship missiles. The PL-8 missile, believed to have been derived from the Israeli Python, is infrared guided, can detect a target from any angle, and can be mounted on a ship along with anti-aircraft guns.

More sophisticated radars reach to the horizon and allow the identification of targets for anti-ship SSMs. Electronic countermeasures have also improved. Chinese destroyers have been equipped with both SAM and SSM systems, and anti-submarine warfare has improved.

Dauphin helicopters, produced under from with France, have enhanced the PLAN's ASW capability. Given a concentrated effort of ASW resources in a limited and shallow zone such as the East China Sea, the PLAN could perform credibly. Since the best submarine killer is probably another submarine, China's purchase of Kilo-class diesel electric boats from Russia represents a significant addition to the PRC's ASW capabilities. Kilos carry twelve 21-inch torpedoes and constitute a significant upgrade from China's elderly Whisky and Romeo class boats.

Submarines and surface combatants have been fitted with a reverse-engineered version of France's Exocet missile - the Ying Ji . With a relatively short 40 kilometer range, it is active radar homing and carries a 165 kilogram warhead. The radar homing and infrared homing HY-2 anti-ship Sea Eagle has a longer effective range of approximately 80 kilometers. The Sea Eagle carries a 513 kilogram warhead, and is believed nuclear-capable. The C- 802 may have a range of 120 kilometers.

Efforts to enhance naval capabilities have experienced problems similar to those faced by the air force. Systems integration continues to pose difficulties. American-made General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engines were purchased to power China's newest class of destroyers, the Luhu. However, the Chinese naval architects responsible for designing the Luhu's hull and engine space seem to have disregarded the engines' size specifications. The hull had to be returned to the shipyard for redesign after at least one ship had already been built.

The navy has over-the-horizon missiles, but not the targeting techniques to make them effective. And, after more than a decade of efforts to improve educational standards, difficulties remain. A 1995 story reported in the Chinese press described an under educated radar-man assigned to submarine duty who could not maintain the equipment he was responsible for.

Land systems

The army of some 2.2 million is equipped with large numbers of weapons, for example, an estimated 7,500 to 8,000 medium battle tanks. Most are copies of older Soviet models, though a number have been upgraded by Israeli technology which has modernised the turrets and fire control systems.

Ground force modernization has received a lower priority than that of the navy and air force, and neither troops nor their equipment are believed to be of high quality. The only major purchase from Russia has been of 70 improved T-72 tanks in 1993. Since Deng's economic reforms the PLA has not been a career of choice. That the military is expected to grow much of its own meat and vegetables detracts from training, as does the PLA's multi-faceted business empire and the corruption it has engendered.

Durability of equipment is a recurrent problem. Poor quality production has reduced the effectiveness of the PLA - Artillery tubes deteriorate quickly in heavy firing, degrading accuracy and posing hazards to gun crews. Chinese vehicles have a reputation for unreliability. The Thai military, which bought a number of Chinese tanks at bargain prices, complained that treads wear out prematurely and fire control systems need excessive maintenance.

China has created a few exceptions among the troops that would be used in any confrontation with China's neighbours. The 23rd and 54th armies are described as highly disciplined and motivated, with well maintained equipment. The 1st and 31st armies are also well regarded, as are the 15th Airborne Army and the marines (naval infantry).

Missiles

China's missile diplomacy against Taiwan in 1995-1996 showed Beijing's growing emphasis on modernising its offensive ballistic missile force. The role of the improved missile forces will include being political instruments of coercion as well as traditional military weapons.

Chinese are modernising their ICBM forces with two new ICBMs, the 8,000 km-range DF-31 and 12,000 km-range DF-41, which are currently under development. A new Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), the JL-2, a naval version of the DF-31, is also under development and will be fitted to the new Type 094 class of SSBN.

China is reported to be pursuing a number of advancements to its missile forces, including the development of multiple re-entry vehicles for the DF-31. There are also reports that they are increasing the accuracy of their missiles with the addition of GPS. They could be using a combination of both the US GPS and the Russian GLONAS system. GPS may be used in the DF-15 Short-Range Ballistic Missile, the type fired during the 1995-1996 Taiwan crisis.

The purchase of two Sovremeny-class destroyers equipped with SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles pose a new threat to navies operating in the region. The SS-N-22 is a formidable missile with a range in excess of 100 km. It is reported that it may be capable of a Mach 4.5 terminal dive speed towards its target that may render current Western ship defences ineffectual.

In the anti-missile field, China has deployed three batteries of Russian-made SA-10Bs (S-300) around Beijing, and a phased-array radar complex provides a ballistic missile early warning capability. Its Russian manufacturer claims that the SA-10B has a capability roughly similar to that of the U.S. Patriot PAC-2, although these claims are unverified.

These ballistic, cruise, and ATBM capabilities increasingly provide Chinese military leaders with a full spectrum of advanced systems to buttress offensive or defensive operations in future crises or conflict scenarios.

Reforming the structure of the PLA

Following the bloody nose received by Vietnam in 1979 Deng initiated a series of reforms of the PLA designed to improve its fighting capability.

Over the course of 10 years, a demobilisation removed more than one million soldiers from the PLA. Its current strength is estimated at just under three million; further reductions are likely.

Educational requirements were instituted for officers, previously they had to prove political rather than technical or leadership qualities. Military academies increasingly focussed on military training and academic subjects, while decreasing the attention given to political and ideological courses. The military rank system, which had been abolished in 1964 in a move toward radical egalitarianism that foreshadowed the Cultural Revolution, was reinstated. A large number of elderly officers were induced to retire.

In order to perpetuate this rejuvenation of the officer corps, a military service law instituted an "up or out" system, with mandatory retirement for senior officers at age 65.

Doctrine shifted away from the expectation of a massive apocalyptic war involving the superpowers and concentrated on preparing for local and regional conflicts. Training exercises were conducted more frequently and in a more sophisticated fashion. Efforts were made to co-ordinate air, sea, and land forces. The exercises were conducted under more varied conditions, and their outcome was no longer predetermined (previously the red team had to win, now the competition was open to be won by the best team).

Evaluating the modernisation

In many cases Russia is selling China equipment of a class that it never exported before. Given the weakness of political control in Russia, it is possible that despite efforts to safeguard production secrets, Russia will be unable to prevent China from getting state-of-the-art systems.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union many predicted that China would fill the security vacuum and take on the mantle of a rival superpower to the USA. China's military purchases show that she is beginning to become a regional power but superpower status is a very long way away. Without an aircraft carrier she can not project force outside of East Asia.

The purchases show the priorities of Chinese military doctrine. Emphasis has been placed on the ability to project power at sea and in the air, and to defend China proper from an air attack. This is in marked contrast to her doctrine during the cold war of focusing upon ground forces to repel a superpower invader.

The one area that Chinese leaders have failed to grasp has been in command and control. While her forces look good on paper, unless they can be effectively co-ordinated, they will be defeated by smaller but smarter enemies. The most recent major military advances have been in communications rather than weapon systems. The conservatism of Chinese generals has lead them to underestimate the importance of C4i.

Flash-points

The overriding security issue for China is Taiwan. The island state is the last of the inhabited regions of China that was 'stolen' by imperialists in the last century (it was annexed by Japan in 1895). Since then it has not been under the jurisdiction of Beijing. The reunification of the two Chinas remains one of Beijing's the most important foreign policy goals.

Taiwan is regarded by Beijing as a breakaway province (see UK Defence Forum paper RS9 Taiwan And The Division Of The World). In 1945, the Allied Powers, assigned Taiwan to China, which was then governed by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT). Taiwan has remained under KMT jurisdiction ever since, though the mainland has been under the control of the Chinese Communist Party since 1949. In 1991, ending four decades during which the CCP and KMT each claimed to be the only legitimate government of all China, the Kuomintang formally renounced control over the mainland. It did not, however, declare the island's independence since the CCP has stated that a declaration of independence will be met with armed resistance. The Taiwan government's official position is that it is part of China, but not a province of the PRC.

This uneasy compromise could be carried by the two governments indefinitely as long as Taiwan does not declare formal independence from the mainland. However there are signes that there is a growing popular sentiment in Taiwan toward formal succession. There is a growing awareness of Taiwanese culture and use of the Taiwanese dialect in government as opposed to Mandarin. Taiwan is a democracy, the majority of Taiwanese believe in human rights that are denied the people of the mainland. Above all, Taiwan's rapid economic growth has given the island the self confidence needed to chart its own course.

The Chinese missile tests that coincided with the 1996 presidential elections were a military response to a real manifestation of Taiwanese sovereignty. China has consistently stated that it would use force if Taiwan declared independence.

There are many reasons why Taiwan and China should avoid war. Not least are the billions of dollars that Taiwan has invested in China's economic development. In addition, the US and Japan have an interest in maintaining the peace between the two Chinas. They would both be expected to put considerable pressure upon both states.

However, the main focus of Chinese military modernisation appears to be to reunify the two states. As well as the nationalism of the Beijing leaders, they are motivated by the fear of loosing face if Taiwan were to declare independence. The loss of prestige could prove extremely damaging to the Chinese leadership.

Should Taiwan declare independence then Beijing will find it very difficult not to use force to reverse the decision. The most likely scenario would be a naval blockade accompanied by a missile bombardment of Taiwan. Chinese leaders would then expect the Taiwanese people to demand that their government rejoin with Beijing.

This type of military action will require:

The Chinese purchases, of fighter aircraft, submarines, destroyers, SAM, and collaboration in cruise missile development are exactly what would be required for a military solution to Taiwanese succession.

The Spratly islands dispute (See UK Defence Forum paperRS8 Conflict in the South China Sea) in the South China Sea is the second potential arena for China's new weapons. The oil rich islands, disputed between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei, are one of the region's most volatile flash-points. Thus far China has avoided military conflict since 1988 and watched all the disputant states, herself included, establish small military presences on the uninhabited reefs.

Imposing her military muscle on the region and forcing out the other states will require a strong naval and air presence thousands of miles away from the mainland. She has already made some steps toward acquiring the necessary naval assets, her submarine fleet will be especially important. However any attempt to use force, or the threat of force, to impose her sovereignty over the islands will require an aircraft carrier and the ships required to escort and supply her.

Until China builds or buys an aircraft carrier her policy in the South China Sea will continue to be based upon words rather than force.

The third potential flash-point is the Korean peninsula. While China does not have a territorial dispute, her close links with North Korea and geographical proximity would make it very difficult for her to stay out of any conflict on the peninsula. A repeat of her 1951 invasion of the south is unthinkable. However she could feel it necessary to intervene militarily to stabilise the situation in the event of a crisis which could be precipitated either by the final collapse of the North Korean state, or attacks upon the South by Northern forces.

Appendix

The Chinese shopping list

The following shopping list was given to the Russians in late 1993 by the Chinese military. It is a full inventory of the military technology Beijing was seeking from Russia. Weapons already constructed and transferred before 1993 – such as the Su 27s – were not on the list. Some items have since been delivered – such as the Il-76 transport, Kilo submarine and S-300 SAM system.

Since 1993 there have been a number of Russian arms fairs in Beijing and Moscow and the list may have been amended with the introduction of new systems. Not all the items will be procured.

Co-operation on military technologies

Weapons for the army

Weapons for the navy

Weapons for the air force