INTRODUCTION

"In November 1995, the framework for digitization of the battlefield paper was taken by the Army Plans and Resources Committee and the recommendations were agreed. The paper identified the need for fundamental change to organisational structures and equipment programmes if the full potential of digital technology was to be realised in the conduct of operations. The aim of the changes proposed was to enhance operational effectiveness by the effective and timely acquisition, processing, distribution and employment of information tailored to the needs of commanders, weapon systems and supporters. It is an approach unashamedly modelled on the current US initiative and which is mirrored by activities in France and Germany."

From the opening paragraph of a 1995 Industry Brief

REQUIREMENTS

Since then 'Digitization of the whole battlespace' has become a preferred term that encompasses the concepts and requirements of the air, land and sea components of a theatre of operations. The Strategic Defence Review, 1998, reinforced the need for an effective solution to enable the joint operations lynch pin theme of the review.

Digitization is not a defence procurement programme in its own right. The process of 'digitizing' has an impact on almost every element of the equipment programme and on all the command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets of the Joint Force. It is not new!

For example, in 1987 the Executive Committee of the Army Board set a goal that an interim full integrated battlefield information system for 1(Br) Corps would be fielded by 2005 and that by 2010 a seamless information system for use in peace and war, on and off the battlefield would be in service. In 1990 a commercial off-the-shelf buy, called SLIM, was fielded in the Gulf War. In spite of its many shortcomings, it represented such a major leap forward for the formation headquarters that they refused to give it up on return to barracks!

The army programme had no funding for even a basic command, control and information system until 2005 at that time. The experience gained led to a system for the Corps HQ in 1995/6, Intermediate Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Information System (IARRCIS), and its fledging, Enhanced IARRCIS, that is being fielded now.

The ill-defined scope of the requirements for communication and information systems to meet the digitization demand has spawned a host of studies. A fundamental and inescapable set of problems faces the bold-hearted designer of the future. The three services have in their current and being-built-now armouries communication and computer systems that range from almost state-of-the-art to 1950s/60s early semiconductor technologies.

The ever increasing ranges and sensitivities of sensors, longer range weapon systems and the pace and multi-faceted nature of battlespace activity shape one of the fundamental features of digitization; that of improving the timeliness and quality of information available to commanders at all levels in the battlespace. This requires an ability to 'share' information across the spectrum including voice, data and video over distributed communications systems, using different carriers, to mobile platforms.

The technologies required to achieve these requirements are available now. Leaving aside the difficulties caused by funding decisions, often taken in relative isolation without regard for their impact on the whole, and the less-than-clear assessments of priorities for the funding that does exist, the requirements specifications for digitization are remarkably difficult to evaluate. There have been and continue to be debates, studies and learned treatise on the issues.

ASSESSMENTS OF BENEFITS

The use of these new information systems brings new difficulties and challenges to established practices. During a series of exercises in 1997, the US Marine Corps found that only 28% of reports from long-range patrols were submitted in 'digital form'. Voice was still much easier when on the move in high tempo operations and the conveyance of emotion in the voice is a powerful tool for a commander.

One senior officer commented "The screens became intoxicating and we looked at them thinking that what we saw was realityÖ..the lack of analysis and flagging of information (because everything that was logged by sensors of all types was displayed) meant the map was all red".

For the British Army a series of studies and interactive simulations, held at battlegroup level, reached some not surprising but nonetheless interesting findings:

The full benefits of improved command, control communications and information systems (C3I) will not be realised unless commanders are trained to make the most effective decisions using the increased amount of information presented.

Specialist C3I applications may have a role to play in assisting the decision making. The more proactive a commander is, the faster and more capable his C3I systems need to be; perhaps suggesting some degree of intelligent knowledge based learning at the human computer interface?

If the systems are degraded for whatever reason, the trained commanders continue to make decisions and plans based on out-of-date/time information which in turn may be implemented too slowly, if the degradation is system wide, with a poorer end result. A supporting investigation confirmed that investment in additional firepower which is not at least matched by improvements in existing C3I is wasted. Investment in the C3I systems in place of additional firepower had a more significant result in terms of battle winning.

Similar results were obtained from a less rigorous study of the effects at Divisional Headquarters. When the results of all these initial studies were combined the increase in 'effectiveness' of a fully digitized division against the current systems was assessed as a factor of almost three. This increase compares favourably with studies conducted elsewhere.

What is clear from all this work is that the investment in digitization has to be combined with an investment in tools and tests to measure the effectiveness of the proposals. The programme cannot stand-alone if the true value of the improvements is to be realised. That means that many of the 'sacred cows' will have to be sacrificed to fund digitization if the effort being applied is not to be wasted.

Procurement delay in digitization increases the cost of digitization and failure to achieve the effectiveness improvements promised.

THE DILEMMAS

Drawing the boundary conditions for digitization is more difficult than determining the technical and cultural changes required to implement the systems. Genuine effectiveness needs new approaches to joint operations, integration of acquisition decisions and mechanisms, joint logistics and transparency of decision making between levels and across air/land/sea divides.

All of these expand the boundaries making the achievement less likely because of the impact on existing and planned procurement. In this, digitization is the imponderable. The future aircraft carrier, strategic airlifter and other programmes have a clear goal and it would be a bold decision to remove funding from some of the major programmes to enable the full and early digitization programme.

Users need to be involved in the definition of requirements and perceived needs if the intranet that is the digitised battlespace is to succeed and the benefits and improvements in effectiveness are to be realised. Supported by effective training and practical experience, a committed user will drive through the changes to his traditional ways. The top-down approach is much less likely to be successful.

Procurement policy must evolve rapidly to begin to support the digitization process.

"You never catch up. All you can do is keep moving so you don't get to far behind and how do you fit these improvements into your procurement cycle? In the past we issued requirements and we took delivery, by which time we were already behind. Now we break projects into smaller parts and they are delivered in increments. It has been successful, we can keep pace with the technology and we always have some new technology coming in."

HOW IS THE UK DOING?

The Strategic Defence Review has started some of the changes needed to enable digitization of the battlespace. The Smart Procurement Initiative promises to go some way towards the incremental acquisition that most recognise as necessary for the programme to succeed. There is not yet enough evidence to suggest that the decision trees and funding issues will be reformed sufficiently to enable the acquisition changes needed to really work.

The quantum change in the speed of acquisition needed to match the rate of change of technology is not evident. Indeed there would appear to be some slowing down because the changes are so rapid that the loop cannot cope.

There has been progress in defining some of the core elements of the overall system such as the Formation Battle Management System, from Corps to battlegroup, (ST(L) 4105, the ITT for which is currently with industry) a little less towards the Battlegroup Battle Management System.

There is an ever-growing list of Battlefield Information System Applications as users flag their specialist requirements. The legacy systems of all three services, in particular the logistic systems, are being reviewed again as part of the development of the Chief of Defence Logistics organisation, itself spawned by the SDR. This task is vast and continues to grow as further stand alone and minimally integrated systems fall out of the procurement pipe to satisfy requirements that may no longer be appropriate.

CONCLUSION

The challenges of Digitization of the Battlespace are very considerable. With a refreshed view of how money spent can make changes to effectiveness without necessarily adding to the hardware programme for new weapons, the process has a chance of becoming reality. Unless the spending priorities and the funding constraints match that view, the programme will not reach the desired conclusion in any sensible time frame and the technology mismatch will increasingly favour those who invest in technology rather than 'bigger bangs'.

March 1999